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Abstract
Using a combination of time-series variation in oil prices and cross-section variation in
the oil intensity of countries, this paper investigates whether exogenous shifts in the gov-
ernment revenues a¤ect the government expenditures di¤erently depending on the political
institutions of the form of government. Comparing the scal policy dynamics in parliamen-
tary and presidential systems, a main nding is that the government expenditures appear
more responsive to shifts in the revenues when the form of government is presidential.
JEL classication: H0; H5; P48
Keywords: Political economy; Constitutions; Fiscal policy; Fiscal dynamics; Oil price.
Phone: +47 46410268. E-mail: jorgen.j.andersen@bi.no.
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which
is to be administered by men over men, the great di¢ culty lies in this: you must rst enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
- James Madison, the Federalist No.51 (Independent Journal, Feb.6, 1788)
1 Introduction
The insight that the form of government matters for policy outcomes is not new, and the lit-
erature indeed documents a strong correlation between the form of government and the size
and composition of government budgets.1 In particular, the levels of government taxes and ex-
penditures are signicantly higher when the form of government is parliamentary, as opposed
to presidential. The mechanisms are, however, not well understood. Moreover, understanding
the e¤ects of the form of government for policy dynamics appear key. There is now mounting
evidence that scal policy is more volatile in presidential systems.2 No existing theories can,
however, explain these empirical regularities,3 and the few empirical contributions that exist on
the dynamic e¤ects of the form of government su¤er from di¤erent problems of identication.4
This paper employs an unbalanced panel of 63 democratic countries, in the period 1970 to
2001, to identify whether the scal e¤ects of exogenous budget shocks vary systematically with the
form of government. Empirical analysis of scal policy is in general demanding, mainly because
of the strong degree of endogeneity in policy determination; clearly, regressing the government
expenditures on the government revenues would not be informative. The rst contribution of
the paper is to propose a novel strategy to identify how changes in the government revenues
a¤ect the path of contemporaneous and future government expenditures. In particular, oil prices
are interacted with predetermined and/or exogenous measures of oil production intensity in the
countries to generate a proxy for the windfall revenues from oil production. It is demonstrated
that the proxy is a strong predictor for current and future changes in the government revenues,
and the estimates suggest that the e¤ective marginal tax rates on the gross value of the oil
windfalls are in the range of 30-40 percent. Importantly, this revenue e¤ect does not vary
1For a broad overview of this research program, see Persson and Tabellini (2004a, 2004b). Persson and Tabellini
(2003) provide an empirical investigation of the e¤ects of the constitutional features of the form of government and
the electoral rules, while Persson and Tabellini (2000a) summarize the theoretical literature. Acemoglu (2005)
o¤ers a critical review of the constitutions literature in general, and of Persson and Tabellini (2003) in particular.
2See, e.g., Fatás and Mihov (2005).
3Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000) analyze the scal e¤ects of the form of government, but their
theory is static and does not contribute to the understanding of scal dynamics. The theory in the literature
that most explicitly addresses the dynamic e¤ects of constitutional rules, is perhaps the Holmstrõm (1999) style
career-concern model by Persson and Tabellini (2000a, Ch. 9). In addition, Persson and Tabellini (2003) o¤er a
discussion on how some of the static models in the literature may be given dynamic interpretations.
4Persson (2002) and Persson and Tabellini (2003) estimate how unobserved common events (i.e., the time
dummies) a¤ect scal policy, and the e¤ects appear stronger if the form of government is parliamentary. The
empirical strategy does however not account for country-specic scal policy trends. Moreover, the unobserved
nature of the identifying eventsdoes not facilitate further theorizing. A similar empirical approach is employed
by Milesi-Feretti et al. (2002). Their shock variable (unemployment) is however endogenous, and, thus, their
estimates might be biased.
signicantly with the form of government. The second contribution is to employ the proposed
strategy to investigate whether the scal responses to the exogenous government revenue shocks
are systematically correlated with the form of government.5 A main result is that the exogenous
government revenue shocks appear to have strong e¤ects for the government expenditures if the
form of government is presidential, while there are, at most, weak and unsystematic e¤ects on
the government expenditures when the form of government is parliamentary. These results are
consistent with the empirical patterns previously documented in the literature (see, e.g., Fatás
and Mihov, 2005) of a higher degree of scal volatility among presidential systems as compared
with parliamentary.
There are several advantages associated with the proposed empirical strategy. First, as the oil
intensity measures are predetermined (or, when utilizing proven oil reserves, possibly exogenous)
and highly persistent, while the real oil prices are highly volatile, the main variation in the
windfall proxy variable is driven by the oil price innovations. In turn, the oil price shocks
are exogenous to the economic- and political environment in most economies, which sharply
reduces the potential of estimation biases due to simultaneity and reverse causation.6 Second,
the time series properties of annual oil prices validates the interpretation of oil price innovations
as permanent, rather than transitory, shifts. Third, because the oil price shocks are highly
observable, their e¤ects on the governmentsbudgets may be identied, given that any additional
e¤ects of the oil price shocks are properly accounted for. In the estimations, other unidentied
scal e¤ects of the oil price shocks are accounted for by including either a full set of time dummies,
or, alternatively, the oil price innovations in themselves (i.e., the percentage change in the oil
price). Finally, there is a signicant amount of variation in the political institutions among the
oil producers, which facilitates a meaningful statistical comparison of the scal e¤ects of oil price
shocks across regime types.
Although the literature o¤ers no fully coherent explanation, or theory, for the main result
in the present paper, (at least) two potential interpretations are available. First, the so-called
veto player theory (e.g., Tsebelis, 1995, 1999, 2002) associates di¤erent political systems with
di¤erent capacities to produce policy change. Tsebelistheory distinguishes between institutional
and partisan veto players, where the former is more prevalent in presidential systems (e.g.,
the president and the chambers), while the latter typically plays a larger role in parliamentary
systems (e.g., the role of parties in the government). The potential for policy change is decreasing
5The empirical strategy in the present paper is similar to the strategy in Acemoglu et al. (2009), who utilize oil
price shocks to investigate the income e¤ects on health expenditures in Economic Sub Regions (ESRs) in the U.S..
Also Persson and Tabellini (2000b) and Persson (2002) make an e¤ort to exploit oil prices to identify comparative
e¤ects of shocks, but their strategy is incapable of distinguishing between the e¤ects of the oil price innovations
and other, correlated shocks.
6Exceptions are the member countries of the OPEC cartel, and the U.S., of which all certainly are in a position
to a¤ect the price of oil. See Wirl (2009) for a review of the potential political determinants of the price of oil,
and for an analysis of the role of OPEC in particular. Most OPEC memebers a considered nondemocratic and
are hence excluded from the current sample throughout. However, all the main results go through also when
excluding the remaining OPEC-members which occasionally are classied as democratic, as well as excluding the
U.S..
in the number of veto players.7 To investigate whether the main result of the paper is driven
by veto player mechanisms, or some other mechanism that is systematically correlated with the
form of government, two measures of the political constraints on the executive and the prevalence
of coalition governments, respectively, are successively included in the regressions. In addition,
a measure of the democratic quality is included, as constitutional rules are likely to be of greater
importance in more advanced democracies.
The inclusion of alternative institutional measures in the regressions provides some support for
the mechanisms of institutional and partisan veto players, as suggested by the theory of Tsebelis;
more political constraints are, if anything, associated with weaker e¤ects of the windfalls on the
government expenditures. The electoral system, however, does not seem to matter.8 Importantly,
including these variables does not shut down or even weaken the separate e¤ect of presidentialism,
which is still strong and statistically signicant. This is an indication that there might be more
to the comparative politics of the form of government in relation to policy dynamics than
can be explained by the veto player theory. One alternative, simple, and intuitive mechanism,
suggested by Torvik (2009, p.247), is that while: presidentialism may be more of a one man
show that can be captured by special interests, parliamentary regimes with their continuous
vote of condence and broader representation in the making of policy, may be better suited to
putting proceeds from resources into productive use.It is not clear, in the current context, what
is more productive spending or saving the windfall revenues but Torviks argument about
the di¤erences between presidentialism and parliamentarism is nonetheless somewhat broader
and more encompassing than what is captured by the veto player framework of Tsebelis. The
results in the present analysis, and the remark by Torvik (2009), clearly indicate that several
of the political mechanisms associated with the e¤ects of the form of government are not well
understood and require further investigation. The proposed methodology, employing natural
experimentsto investigate the comparative e¤ects of the form of government, and the results
from the analysis in the current paper, are contributions in the greater project of expanding
our knowledge of the economic e¤ects of political institutions in general, and of the form of
government in particular.
In addition to investigating the role of veto players, several additional robustness checks are
performed. The main results appear robust to di¤erent model specications and operational-
izations of the oil windfalls, to the intensity of oil production and the general level of economic
development, to IV- and GMM estimation methods, and to symmetry issues (in particular,
positive and negative realizations of the oil windfalls are shown to have similar e¤ects).
Besides constituting a stepping stone for theorizing, the present results may have even more
important and far-reaching economic implications. There is now a growing literature, initiated
by the contribution of Ramey and Ramey (1995), which documents negative e¤ects of output
7Note that an additional mechanism in Tsebelistheory is that the ideological distance between the veto players
matters; the larger the distance, the more likely is new legislation to be biased towards the status quo.
8The pattern that coalition governments are more common under proportional electoral rules (Persson et al.
2004c), implies that coalition government should be less frequent in presidential systems because of the positive
correlation between presidentialism and majoritarian electoral rules (see, e.g., Müller, 2008)
volatility on economic growth. In addition, as emphasized by van der Ploeg and Poelhekke
(2009a;b), among others, scal policy volatility is an important source of volatility in output.
The results presented in the current paper hence suggest that the form of government may be
decisive for the long term e¤ects of exogenous budget shocks. The present results may thus shed
some light on why natural resource abundance, and in particular oil, appear to harm growth if
the form of government is presidential, but not if it is parliamentary (Andersen and Aslaksen,
2008): Government revenue volatility appear to generate stronger expenditure volatility when
the form of government is presidential.
2 Data
2.1 Main variables
Data on the total government revenues, TGREVit, and expenditures, TGEXPit, are mainly
borrowed from a study by Brender and Drazen (2005). Both measures are dened as ratios to
GDP. Because the identifying windfall variable (to be dened in Section 2.3) is likely to a¤ect
the contemporaneous level of GDP, the time di¤erenced scal policy variables (TGREVit and
TGEXPit) are dened in terms of GDP in time t   1 rather than in time t, to reduce en-
dogeneity in these variables. Second, the study relies on data on the level of oil production,
OIL_PRODit, and on oil prices (measured in 2000 USD), OIL_PRICEt, which are collected
from the WDI and the World Banks Adjusted Net Savings dataset (sometimes referred to as
the genuine savings dataset). The analysis also makes use of data on the size of the proven
petroleum reserves, OIL_RESERV ESit, provided by the Energy Information Administration
(EIA). Third, countries are assigned constitutional classications in accordance with the liter-
ature. Using the denitions of Persson and Tabellini (2003), as well as data from the World
Banks Dataset on Political Institutions (DPI), countries are assigned indicator variables depen-
dent on the specic constitutional features they are recognized by. In particular, years in which
a government is not subject to a condence requirement are coded as PRESit = 1, otherwise
PRESit = 0. In addition to the indicators for the form of government, the analysis also em-
ploys an indicator variable for the electoral system and a measure of the political constraints
on the executive. Years in which the lower house was elected exclusively through plurality rule
in the most recent elections are coded as MAJit = 1, whereas years in which the lower house
was elected by proportional rules are coded as MAJit = 0. The extent of political constraint
on the executive is captured by the variable POLCONIIIit, which is borrowed from Henisz
(2000, 2002). Finally, a battery of control variables that for various reasons have been suggested
to a¤ect the government revenues and expenditures is being employed.9 The vector of control
variables include the real per capita income (in logs), LGDPCAPit, measures of demographic
9See Persson and Tabellini (2003) for a survey of the literature, and Sanz and Velazquez (2007) for the
importance of demographics.
composition, PROP_1564it and PROP_65it, and a multidimensional index of global integra-
tion, KOFit. The former three controls are taken from the WDI database, while the latter is
borrowed from Dreher (2006) (updated in Dreher et al., 2008).
All observations must satisfy a democracy requirement to be allowed into the sample. The
standard threshold level in the literature (see, e.g., Pevehouse, 2002) is given by POLITY_2it 
6, where the POLITY_2it variable is borrowed from the Polity IV data set. Accordingly, only
years in which the countries receive a score of six and above on this index are classied as
democratic. This threshold is restrictive, which prevents the inuence of non-democratic policies
or processes of democratization.10 However, as a robustness check, also even more restrictive
thresholds are being employed.11 Given the data at hand, inference is based on up to 63 countries
and some 1100 observations, implying on average of between 15 and 20 annual observations per
country.
2.2 Sample
Table 1 provides an overview over the countries in the sample, and list their respective con-
stitutional classications.12 In addition, the table indicates the maximum value of oil production
in GDP, OIL_GDPit, in one single year for all of the countries. All countries in Table 1 are
considered democratic in at least three consecutive years within the sample period, according to
the democracy rule discussed in the previous section.
There are several things to note from Table 1. First, a majority (40) of the countries in the
sample derives, or have derived, positive revenues from oil production within the sample period.
Thus, the sample also includes countries without oil production. Although these countries do not
contribute directly to the identication of the windfall e¤ects, they improve the identication of
any additional e¤ects on scal policy of the oil price innovations, which is potentially crucial for
the identication of the windfall e¤ects working via the government revenues of the oil producers.
Second, a signicant fraction (about 30 percent) of the oil producers have experienced years
within the sample period in which the net value of oil extraction have exceeded ve percent
of GDP. The oil producers are evenly distributed across regime types. Third, employing the
stronger democracy threshold of POLITY_2it  9 does not reduce the sample size by much,
and there is still a considerable amount of variation in the oil revenues among the countries. The
10Several studies nd that oil a¤ects democratization (Ross 2001, Tsui 2010; Aslaksen 2007, Gassebner et al.
2009). In addition, oil has been found to a¤ect the level of corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1999, Sala-I-Martin and
Subramanian 2003, Aslaksen 2007). The latter ndings, however, are robust only among the weak democracies
and the non-democratic countries, and should hence not be a major concern in the current study, in which the
focus is on democracies only.
11 In particular, the main results are robust to employing the threshold POLITY _2it  9 (table is not shown,
but can be made available upon request) and to the exclusion of specic countries which have switched from
autocracy to democracy during the sample period (Turkey, Argentina, Peru, Chile).
12Note that Papua New Guinea was considered an extreme outlier and was removed from the sample, thorugh-
out: The relative importance of oil in GDP in Papua New Guinea is more than twice as high as in any other
country in the parliamentary sample (followed by Norway) and amounts to some 25 percent of GDP in the sample
period. All of the main results remain however also when including Papua New Guinea.
nal column in Table 1 indicates which observations drop out of the sample when employing the
stricter democracy threshold. Finally, there is only one registered lasting constitutional reform
(Cyprus reformed its electoral system in 1981 from majoritarian to proportional), which reects
an institutional inertia that sometimes is being referred to as an iron law by the political
scientists.13 The lack of constitutional reforms is the main reason why standard panel data
evidence on constitutional e¤ects is so hard, if not impossible, to achieve.
Table 2 provides some key descriptive statistics, for the whole sample and across regime types.
The general insights from the literature on the economic e¤ects of constitutions are conrmed. On
average, the level of government expenditures is higher in countries with a parliamentary form of
government and/or a proportional electoral rule; and a larger fraction of the government budget
is allocated towards social security and welfare spending (CGSSWit) among the parliamentary
countries. Hence, the sample appears to be representative with respect to the existing literature
on constitutional e¤ects (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Note that for most of the scal
policy measures, the within group variation is large relative to the overall variation (in Table 2,
indicated by high values ofW:=O:) which is important for making panel inference in specications
that include country specic trends. Moreover, the average value of oil production in GDP,
OIL_GDPit, is about 2 percent, which indicates that oil production on average constitutes a
signicant fraction of the economy. Oil price uctuations would hence be expected to cause
signicant uctuations in the oil production revenues among the oil producers. Finally, virtually
all of the variation in the WINDFALLit variable, which will constitute the main identifying
variable in the analysis, is within-country variation. Because oil production intensity di¤ers
substantially between countries, but not so much within countries over time, the main within-
country variation in the WINDFALLit variable is caused by innovations in the price of oil,
which is subject to substantial uctuations over time.
3 Identication and empirical results
3.1 Oil windfalls and government revenues
The main identifying assumption of the analysis is that the governments of oil producing
countries receive some positive amount of revenues from the oil production sector.14 Panel
data on petroleum tax schedules for a broad cross-section of countries are not readily available,
hence the size of the e¤ect of an oil windfall on the total government revenues in GDP must be
13Note that France conducted a brief experiment with proportional electoral rules in the period 1985-1986.
Moreover, Spain has been classied as presidential during two years of transition to democracy in 1976-1977, and
Pakistan has been classied as presidential for a couple of years in the 70. None of these countries or observations,
however, drive any of the main e¤ects in the paper.
14There are few, if any, examples of countries in which there is oil production and where the government does
not receive any revenues from this sector. Even among the small oil producers these revenues can be signicant.
One example is Denmark, who reports (see: http://www.ens.dk/sw51664.asp) that the sum of taxes and fees from
the activities in the North sea amounted to about DKK 31 billion in 2006, and just a little less (DKK 7 billion)
in 2005, which amounts to 2-3 percent of the total government revenues.
estimated. An oil windfall in country i in time t is dened in the following way,
WINDFALLit = OIL_PRICEt OIL_INTENSITYi; (1)
where OIL_PRICEt is the innovation in the real world market price of oil (in 2000 USD)
from time t   1 to t, and OIL_INTENSITYi is a measure of the economic importance of oil
in country i. Because oil price shocks appear to be permanent, the WINDFALLit variable has
the interpretation of an unanticipated permanent income shock, relative to GDP, in a country i
in time t.15
Ideally, the WINDFALLit measure would employ an exogenous and time-invariant measure
of the oil intensity in each country i. However, in reality (i.e., in the data) such a variable
does not exist, hence the analysis relies on several operationalizations which are time varying.
In the regressions, OIL_INTENSITYi is proxied for using di¤erent measures of the relative
importance of oil production in GDP. Because oil production may be endogenous to factors that
simultaneously a¤ect scal policy decisions, it will be central to the analysis to demonstrate that
the main results are robust to di¤erent operationalizations of the OIL_INTENSITYi variable.
The baseline operationalization is to proxy OIL_INTENSITYi by OILPROD_GDPit 1 =
OIL_PRODit 1=GDPit 1, where OIL_PRODit 1 is the oil production (in tons) in country i
in t   1, and GDPit 1 is the gross domestic product in country i in t   1. The proxy variable
OILPROD_GDPit 1 is predetermined to reduce policy endogeneity in the oil intensity variable.
However, lagging the variable by one year might not be su¢ cient to avoid endogeneity, hence
also deeper lags of the oil production volume (ve- and ten years), relative to the GDP in
t   1, will be employed as robustness checks on the baseline operationalization. Finally, the
analysis makes use of the level of proven oil reserves (relative to GDP in t   1) as a proxy for
OIL_INTENSITYi. The level of proven oil reserves in a country is positively correlated with
the level of oil production in a country, but is not likely to be endogenous to current volatility
(or sources of current volatility) in the government revenues.
The e¤ect of oil windfalls on the government revenues is estimated using the following em-
pirical model
TGREVit = TGREVit 1 +
2X
j=0
jWINDFALLit j +X
0
it + i + Zt + uit: (2)
In equation (2), Xit is a vector of rst di¤erenced control variables, i has the interpretation of
country specic trends in the government revenues, Z is a vector of time dummies, and, nally,
uit is assumed to be pure white noise and hence that E (uit) = 0 for all i, t.
The country specic trend term, i, is potentially crucial for the identication of the s.
15Acemoglu et al. (2009) show that augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests fail to reject the null hypothesis
that log oil prices follow a unit root. This is also the case for the time period of the current analyses. This
evidence suggests that the present empirical strategy will be informative about the e¤ects of permanent (rather
than transitory) changes in income on government revenues and, consequently, expenditures.
Given the existing evidence that countries indeed have followed di¤erent paths with regard to
the size of government, it is important not to confound these trends with the e¤ects of the
oil windfalls.16 In particular, by excluding the is from model (2) one would run the risk of
confounding the e¤ects of oil windfall shocks with the country- or constitution specic scal
policy trends.17
The price of oil a¤ects the economy and scal policy via several additional, and often more
economically important channels than the e¤ects that work via the government revenues of the
oil producers. For example, the price of oil often correlates with international business cycles,
and has direct and indirect e¤ects for both the production costs of public goods and services,
as well as for the demand of the same goods and services. Moreover, the price of oil a¤ects the
general protability of private production and thus the tax bases of countries. Hence, the Zts
are included to capture the general economic and political e¤ects of oil price innovations and
international business cycles.
Finally, the identication rests on the inclusion of a relevant set of controls. In the present
context, the relevant controls are taken to be the standard and most robust set of determinants
of the size of government in the constitutions literature. Because the model is in rst di¤erences,
so are the included controls. Hence all variables are dened as the changes from time t   1 to
time t, denoted by the rst-di¤erence operator . The baseline set of controls are (the change
in) GDP per capita (in logs) (LGDP_CAPit) which is a measure of idiosyncratic, country
specic business cycles , the degree of global integration (KOFit), and a set of demographic
variables (PROP_1564it and PROP_65it). In addition, since the windfall variable has
the interpretation of an interaction term, each (time varying) element in this term are always
included among the control variables.
Table 3 displays the results from employing model (2) to estimate the contemporaneous and
lagged e¤ects of the oil windfalls on the changes in the government revenues, in the full sample and
in the main subsamples of parliamentary and presidential systems, respectively. The regressions
in Table 3 account for two, specic nonlinearities in the e¤ect of oil windfalls on the government
revenues. First, because one might worry that oil windfalls have di¤erent e¤ects dependent on
the oil intensity of the countries which might be of particular importance in the present context
because the mean oil intensity in the presidential subsample is signicantly higher than the mean
oil intensity among the parliamentary countries all regressions are estimated both on the full
subsamples, as well as on subsamples which are constrained to include only country-years with a
net contribution from the oil sector of at least 0.5 percent in GDP. These latter subsamples are
referred to as Oil richin the table. Second, the regressions take into account that the level of
16See, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2003) for evidence on the heterogeneity in scal policy trends across countries
and constitutional categories.
17Person and Tabellini (2003) nd that the scal policy responses to exogenous shocks are stronger in parlia-
mentary than in presidential systems. Their study does however not include country-specic trends, hence the
estimates of the scal e¤ects of common shocks are likely to be biased. In particular, their main nding may
reect the steeper long-term trend in the size of government in parliamentary systems, rather than responses to
economic shocks.
economic development matters, which may be a concern because the mean GDP is signicantly
lower in the subsample of presidential systems compared with the subsample of parliamentary
systems. Hence, the country-years are also separated with respect to the level of development,
and country-years are categorized as Developedin the table if the level of real GDP per capita
exceeds 4000 USD (denoted in constant 2000 USD). As indicated by the estimates in Table 3,
however, none of these two concerns appear to be of signicant importance; the aggregate e¤ect
of the windfalls aggregated over the three consecutive periods implied by the lag structure
indicates that the windfalls exert a positive e¤ect on the total government revenues across both
regime types, and that the e¤ects do not appear to signicantly depend on neither the oil intensity
nor the level of economic development. Moreover, the aggregate e¤ects are similar across the
two regime types, and lie in the range 0.3-0.4. Assuming that the estimates indeed reect tax
revenues from the petroleum sector, the estimates thus imply an e¤ective marginal tax rate
somewhere in the range of 30-40 percent. Thus, the estimates suggest that an oil windfall of
a value of ten percent in GDP is expected to boost the government revenues by some three
to four percent in GDP. The magnitude of the estimates appear sensible; oil production, being
intrinsically immobile, is usually taxed quite heavily, and when adjusting for risk- and production
costs an e¤ective marginal tax rate of 30-40 appears a plausible estimate.
It appears from the estimates in Table 3 that the second lag of the windfalls are associated
with negative e¤ects for the government revenues. Although these e¤ects are not statistically
signicant at any conventional level, they appear somewhat puzzling. One available and straight-
forward interpretation, however, is tax substitution. When governments experience a positive
(negative) shock to the government revenues, an optimal response may be to cut down on (in-
crease) other and potentially more costly sources of taxation. If policy is associated with some
level of inertia, such e¤ects would typically appear with lags, and this type of dynamics can
hence be a potential explanation for why we observe a negative lagged e¤ect of windfalls on the
government revenues.18
The model appears to perform quite well as it seems to be capable of delivering credible and
consistent estimates of the e¤ects of oil windfalls on the government revenues of oil producing
countries. There are, however, several potential challenges which will be addressed successively.
First, as briey discussed above, the operationalization of the variable OIL_INTENSITYi
is not straight forward. Conceptually, OIL_INTENSITYi is a time-independent and purely
exogenous variable. However, such a variable rarely exists. For example, the level of oil pro-
duction in a country i is at any point in time t likely to be a function of the intensity of past
and present petroleum activity in that country, which in turn is associated with historical and
present political factors. Hence, instead of relying on just one single operationalization of the
OIL_INTENSITYi variable, several di¤erent approaches will be employed. The regression
estimates displayed in Table A1a in the Appendix make use of three alternative operationaliza-
tions of OIL_INTENSITYi. In the table, Five yearsrefers to an operationalization where
18Note that this pattern of tax substitution is consistent with standard macroeconomic models of optimal
intertemporal allocation of wealth shocks, such as for example Barros (1979) tax smoothing hypothesis.
OIL_INTENSITYi is proxied byOILPROD_GDPit 5 (= OIL_PRODit 5=GDPit 1), Ten
yearsrefers to the operationalization OILPROD_GDPit 10 (= OIL_PRODit 10=GDPit 1),
and, nally, Reservesrefers to the operationalizationOILRESERV ES_GDPit 1 (= OIL_RESERV ESit
107=GDPit 1). The latter operationalization (which reads the amount of oil reserves, in tens of
tons, per predetermined unit of GDP measured in constant 2000 USD) has no straightforward,
intuitive interpretation, except that the level of proven oil reserves is assumed to be a proxy
for the level of oil production in a given country in a given year, and hence the measure is a
proxy for the oil intensity in that country. What matters in the current context, is whether this
proxy, together with the other alternative operationalizations, delivers e¤ects that are similar
to those in the baseline regressions in Table 3. Comparing the results in Table A1a and Table
3 (columns (1), (4), and (7)) provides an indication that the results in Table 3 are robust to
the alternative operationalizations, with the exception of the ten year lagged variable in the
parliamentary sample which does not appear to exert a positive e¤ect on the government rev-
enues. A potential worry is, however, that several of the estimates in the sample of parliamentary
systems are insignicant at the conventional levels. One interpretation is that the alternative
OIL_INTENSITYit operationalizations are more noisy than the baseline operationalization,
and a way of removingnoise from the estimations is to focus attention on a more homogenous
sample. In Table A1b, the estimates are based on the subsamples of Oil rich country-years
(as in Table 3 columns (2), (5) and (8)). As expected, the estimates in Table A1b are more
precise. Moreover, the overall explanatory power is also higher, with an R-squared (within) in
the parliamentary sample in the range of 0.3 to 0.4, compared with 0.08 in Table A1a. Taken
together, the evidence suggests that oil windfalls exert positive e¤ects on the government rev-
enues, but not unexpectedly more so in the Oil richcountry-years. Importantly, comparing
across the two di¤erent forms of government the overall e¤ects of oil windfalls for the government
revenues appear comparable in magnitude.19
3.1 Comparative politics
The previous section documents evidence that the oil windfalls have signicant and positive
e¤ects for the government revenues. This section investigates and compares the e¤ects of the
shifts in the government revenues caused by the windfall shocks on the government expenditures
across the two forms of government. The structural relationship of interest is,
TGEXPit = 
0TGEXPit 1 +
2X
j=0
0jTGREVit j +X
0
it
0 + 0i + 
0Zt + uit; (3)
19One additional worry when estimating dynamic panel data models such as model (1) is that the estimates
could be biased due to the systematic correlation between the lagged regressand and the error term. The Nickell
bias (Nickell, 1981) is however less severe the longer is the panel (see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2002). As the average
panel length in the current analysis is between 15 and 20, the xed e¤ects estimator is expected to perform quite
well. As a check on the potential severity of this source of bias, the Table 3 regressions were also estimated
employing the standard Di¤erence and System GMM estimators (see, e.g., Bond, 2002). The GMM estimates
(which are available upon request) were highly consistent with the OLS-FE estimates.
where the parameters have similar interpretations as in (2). The baseline empirical strategy
thus implies that not only the 0js, but also all of the other parameters are allowed to vary
across the regime types.20 Clearly, estimating (3) with OLS would result in highly signicant
estimates of the 0js as TGREVit and TGEXPit are strongly correlated;
21 however, the
results would obviously be severely biased due to endogeneity in TGREVit. The empirical
strategy of the present paper is, as discussed in the introduction, to deal with this problem
of endogeneity by employing the proposed windfall proxy to instrument for the changes in the
government revenues, TGREVit. In particular, TGREVit is instrumented for using model
(2) in the rst-stage regressions.22
The results from the 2SLS IV-regressions are displayed in Table 4, where columns (1)-(3)
report the results for the full sample, while columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9) display the results for the
parliamentary- and presidential regime types, respectively. Given the validity of the IV-estimates,
which will be discussed in more detail below, the estimates in Table 4 suggest that (i) shocks in
the government revenues have positive, causal e¤ects for the government expenditures, but (ii)
the e¤ects appear to critically depend on the form of government. While the e¤ects are strong and
signicant (at the one percent level in two out of three subsamples) in the presidential sample,
the estimates are nonsignicant and unstable in the parliamentary sample (and subsamples).
The aggregate e¤ects of the three lags of government revenue shocks in the presidential sample,
and subsamples, are in the range of 0.5-0.8, implying that a positive shock in the government
revenues in t, of, say, 5 percent in GDP, implies an increase in the government expenditures
over the subsequent two years (from t to t + 2) of some 2.5 to 4 percent in GDP. The evidence
reported in Table 4 hence suggests that the short term pass-through of government revenue shocks
to the government expenditures is insignicant if the form of government is parliamentary, while
it is highly signicant, both economically and statistically, when the form of government is
presidential.
The rst stage F-tests, reported below the parameter estimates in the table, indicate that
the current and lagged WINDFALLit variables are generally strong predictors of variation in
the government revenues. The F-statistics are weaker in the parliamentary sample, which is
not surprising given that there is less variation in the oil windfall variables in this sample. The
F-statistics is comparatively weaker in columns (4) and (6), which may be explained by the
evidence in Table 3 that these parameter estimates are characterized by more noise (i.e., higher
standard deviations) in the parameter estimates.
Considering the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-, Anderson-Rubin Wald-, and the Hansen J statis-
tics of the regressions on the full sample (columns (1) to (3)), the instruments appear generally
20This assumption will be relaxed in a reduced-form approach in Section 3.3, where all parameters but the
institutional will be estimated in one single regression and hence will be constrained to take on the same values
across both forms of government.
21The pairwise correlation coe¢ cent between the two is 0.80, signicant at the one percent level of signicance.
22Note that in the rst-stages of the IV-regressions, three lags of the windfall variable are being employed,
instead of two, as in Table 3. Employing three lags is necessary to achieve a good identication of the second lag
of TGREV . The main results of interest do however not critically depend the inclusion or exclusion of single
lags of the WINDFALL variables.
strong and exogenous.23 There is, however, some indication that the instruments may be weak,
in particular in the parliamentary subsample. In columns (4) and (6), both the Kleibergen-Paap
rk Wald F-statistic and the Hansen J-statistic indicate weak and potentially endogenous instru-
ments, while, on the other hand, the Anderson-Rubin Wald statistic rejects the joint hypothesis
that the coe¢ cients of the endogenous regressors are jointly equal to zero in the structural equa-
tion in two out of the three samples (the exception is the Developedsample, in Column (6)).
In the sample of parliamentary Oil richcountries, Column (5), both the Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald statistic and the Hansen J statistic indicate that the instruments perform well, and the
Anderson-Rubin Wald F statistic suggests that the endogenous regressors are statistically sig-
nicant (with a p-value of 0.07). Thus, there is some indication of instrument weakness, but the
overall evidence supports the validity of the instruments, and hence that the estimates can be
trusted.
3.3 Additional sensitivity checks
The form of government may correlate with other constitutional features, such as the electoral
rule.24 Moreover, also other institutional features correlate with the form of government, such as
the formal political constraints on the executive, veto players (Tsebelis, 1995, 1999, 2002),25 and
the overall institutional quality. Table A2 in the Appendix displays the results from employing
a reduced-form approach, regressing the government expenditures on the windfall variables (and
their separate, constituting terms) in interaction with the di¤erent institutional correlates, to
check whether the main results of the paper are likely to be driven by the form of government,
or by some other institutional correlates. The windfall-presidential interaction terms are positive
throughout, while the other institutional correlates are for the most part statistically insignicant
(and unstable). In the full specication (Column (6)), the constitutional interactions (i.e., the
form of government and the electoral rule) are the only ones which are statistically signicant,
and presidentialism appear much more important for the scal dynamic e¤ect of the exogenous
23The Stock-Yogo (2005) critical values are not available in the baseline specication with three endogenous
regressors (in the tables, TGREV , TGREV 1, TGREV 2) and four excluded instruments (in the tables,
WINDFALL, WINDFALL 1, WINDFALL 2, WINDFALL 3), thus the extent of the weakness in the
identication, as suggested by the Kleibergen-Paap rk F-statistics, can not easily be assessed. However, in the
more restrictive, but less demanding specication employing only two lags of the endogenous regressor (TGREV ,
TGREV 1), the Stock-Yogo critical values are available, and the F-statistics are well above the critical value
for 10% maximal IV relative bias in both the full sample and the sample of presidential countries, whereas among
the parliamentary samples this is only the case within the oil rich subsample (table not shown, but available
upon request). The Stock-Yogo critical values are for Cragg-Donald F statistic and i.i.d. errors, as reported by
Stata, version 10.1.
24 In the current sample, the pairwise correlation between presidentialism and majoritarian electoral rule is
-0.13, signicant at the one percent level.
25Several papers have investigated the interaction between institutions, di¤erent veto player measures, and the
responsiveness to economic shocks (e.g., Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Alesina and Drazen,1991). Using data on U.S.
state government, Poterba (1994) shows that divided governments as opposed to governments consisting of just
one single party tend to block scal adjustments. Auerbach (2008) present recent evidence on the e¤ect of the
U.S. federal budget rules.
oil windfalls than having a majoritarian electoral rule. Also, the magnitude of the e¤ects appear
consistent with the previous results, as implied by the estimates in Tables 3 and 4.
An additional question is whether the windfall e¤ects are symmetric, that is whether positive
and negative realizations of oil price shocks have similar e¤ects for the scal dynamics. Table
A3 reports the results from running separate regressions on positive (> 0) and negative (< 0)
shocks, respectively, on the current and future government revenues, for the whole sample as well
as for both forms of governments separately. To achieve a consistent identication of the separate
e¤ects of positive and negative shocks, the regression samples are constrained to sequences of at
least two consecutive positive and negative shocks, respectively. In particular, inference is based
on 143 sequences of positive shocks and 235 sequences of negative shocks. Since the sample
is constrained to sequences of two consecutive shocks that are qualitatively similar, so is the
regression model, which now employs only one lag (instead of two, as in the baseline model).26
The results displayed in Table A4 indicate that the e¤ects of oil price shocks for the government
revenues are fairly symmetric; thus, positive shocks are expected to have positive e¤ects, while
negative shocks have negative e¤ects on the current and future government revenues.
4 Final remarks and avenues for future research
The main nding of the present paper that government revenue shocks have strong e¤ects for the
government expenditures if the form of government is presidential, but not if it is parliamentary
has several potential implications. First, it constitutes a guide for further theorizing on the
dynamic scal e¤ects of the form of government. Hopefully, future models will be able to ratio-
nalize and investigate in more detail the legislative mechanisms that can be consistent with the
empirical patterns. Second, the results might shed some light on the literature linking political
institutions with scal policy volatility, and in turn growth. The present results suggest that
scal policy might be more volatile in the presence of shocks to the government revenues when
the form of government is presidential. This result is consistent with the regularity that scal
policy is more volatile when the form of government is presidential (Fatás and Mihov, 2005),
which may have e¤ects for the long-term capacity for economic growth.
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6 Tables
Country PRES MAJ Dem. years >0% >1% >5% Strong Dem.
Austria 0 0 1970-2001 Yes Yes
Belgium 0 0 1970-2001 Yes
Cyprus* 0 0 1981-2001 Yes
Czech Rep. 0 0 1992-2001 Yes Yes
Denmark 0 0 1970-2001 Yes Yes
Estonia 0 0 1992-2001 No
Finland 0 0 1970-2001 Yes
France* 0 0 1985-1986 Yes Yes
Germany 0 0 1989-2001 Yes Yes
Greece 0 0 1974-2001 Yes 1985-2001
Hungary 0 0 1990-2001 Yes Yes
Ireland 0 0 1970-2001 Yes
Israel 0 0 1970-2001 Yes Yes Yes
Italy 0 0 1970-2001 Yes Yes
Japan 0 0 1970-2001 Yes 1973-2001
Netherlands 0 0 1970-2001 Yes Yes
Norway 0 0 1970-2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Poland 0 0 1990-2001 Yes 1994-2001
Portugal 0 0 1975-2001 1976-2001
Romania 0 0 1996-2001 Yes Yes No
Slovak Rep. 0 0 1992-2001 Yes 1997-2001
Slovenia 0 0 1993-2001 Yes
South Africa 0 0 1992-2001 Yes Yes 1993-2001
Spain** 0 0 1977-2001 Yes Yes
Sweden 0 0 1970-2001 Yes Yes
Turkey 0 0 72-77/82-01 Yes 72-77/88-92
[n(PRES =0, MAJ =0)=26] [=19] [=4] [=1] [=24]
Australia 0 1 1970-2001 Yes Yes Yes
Botswana 0 1 1970-2001 1996-2001
Bulgaria 0 1 1991-2001 Yes 2000-2001
Canada 0 1 1970-2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cyprus* 0 1 1973-1980 Yes
France* 0 1 70-84/86-01 Yes 1986-2001
India 0 1 1970-2001 Yes Yes 70-74/94-01
Mauritius 0 1 1970-2001 Yes
Nepal 0 1 1990-2001 No
New Zealand 0 1 1970-2001 Yes Yes Yes
Pakistan** 0 1 1988-1998 Yes Yes No
Thailand 0 1 1991-2001 Yes Yes
UK 0 1 1970-2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes
[n(PRES =0, MAJ =1)=14] [=9] [=6] [=2] [=11]
Sample: Countries, constitutions, oil production intensity, and level of democracy
Table 1
Maximum value of oil depletion in 
GDP (OIL_GDP ) in one year
Table 1 (continued)
(Table continues on next page)
Country PRES MAJ Dem. years >0% >1% >5% Strong Dem.
Argentina 1 0 72-75/82-01 Yes Yes Yes No
Bolivia 1 0 1982-2001 Yes Yes Yes 1984-2001
Brazil 1 0 1985-2001 Yes Yes No
Colombia 1 0 1970-2001 Yes Yes Yes 1990-1994
Costa Rica 1 0 1970-2001 Yes
Dom. Rep. 1 0 1978-2001 No
Ecuador*** 1 0 1979-2001 Yes Yes Yes 1979-1999
El Salvador 1 0 1982-2001 No
Fiji 1 0 1974-1986 Yes
Guatemala 1 0 1995-2001 Yes Yes No
Honduras 1 0 1981-2001 No
Mexico 1 0 1996-2001 Yes Yes Yes No
Nicaragua 1 0 1990-2001 No
Paraguay 1 0 1991-2001 No
Peru 1 0 79-91/00-01 Yes Yes Yes 2000-2001
Spain** 1 0 1976-1977 Yes No
Sri Lanka 1 0 1970-2001 1970-1977
Switzerland 1 0 1970-2001 Yes
Uruguay 1 0 1984-2001 Yes
Venezuela*** 1 0 1970-2001 Yes Yes Yes 1970-1991
[n(PRES =1, MAJ =0)=20] [=10] [=9] [=7] [=10]
Chile 1 1 70-72/88-01 Yes 1999-2001
Gambia 1 1 1970-1993 No
Korea, Rep. 1 1 1987-2001 No
Lithuania 1 1 1992-2001 Yes Yes
Madagascar 1 1 1992-2001 1992-1996
Mali 1 1 1991-2001 No
Pakistan** 1 1 1987-1988 Yes No
Philippines 1 1 1986-2001 Yes No
US 1 1 1970-2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes
[n(PRES =1, MAJ =1)=9] [=5] [=1] [=1] [=4]
Note: Constitutional classification: Countries/years in which lower house legislative elections rely exclusively on plurality rules are 
coded as MAJ =1 (otherwise, MAJ =0). Countries in which the executive is relying on the confidence of the legislature are coded 
PRES = 1 (otherwise, PRES =0). * Country has undergone electoral reform. ** Country has undergone reform in the form of 
government. *** OPEC member. "Dem. years" means years in which the country has received a POLITY_2  score >=6. "Strong 
Dem" means a POLITY_2  score >=9.
Variable Mean Overall W./O. N/n/T Mean N/n/T Mean N/n/T
TGEXP 28.0 11.7 0.5 1211/63/19 32.2 503/26/19 18.9 231/16/14
TGREV 25.5 10.7 0.4 1208/63/19 29.1 506/26/19 17.3 232/16/15
TGBAL -2.5 3.9 0.7 1203/63/19 -3.1 503/26/19 -1.6 231/16/14
CGSSW 9.0 6.3 0.3 777/45/17 12.2 321/17/19 4.4 127/11/12
GDP_CAP 10.2 9.3 0.3 1564/67/23 13.2 621/28/22 5.7 302/16/19
OIL_GDP 1.9 5.4 0.4 1599/67/24 1.1 621/28/22 7.6 302/16/19
WINDFALL 0.000 0.019 0.994 1344/66/21 0.007* 540/27/20 0.041* 256/16/16
Note: W./O. is the ratio of the within group std. dev. to the overall std. dev.. Asterisks (*) indicate that the values refer to overall standard 
deviations, rather than the mean.
Table 2
Std. Dev.
All countries Parl. Form of gov. Pres. Form of gov.
Descriptive statistics
Regime type
Sample All Oil rich Devel. All Oil rich Devel. All Oil rich Devel.
Estimation method OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
WINDFALL 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.20*** -0.12 0.06 -0.16 0.16*** 0.13** 0.19***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
WINDFALL-1 0.12*** 0.15** 0.10** 0.39** 0.35** 0.41** 0.16*** 0.20*** 0.11***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.17) (0.14) (0.18) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
WINDFALL-2 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 0.03
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03)
OILPROD_GDP-1 81.44* 78.75* 171.29** 126.74 -5.92 140.16 118.34** 104.35* 227.02***
(41.00) (42.69) (65.90) (102.16) (29.81) (104.55) (50.09) (51.86) (31.93)
OILPROD_GDP-2 -56.24*** -45.80***-196.73*** -116.94 -63.13 -143.46 -45.73*** -45.64*** -161.73**
(22.11) (12.19) (68.82) (117.62) (40.54) (121.06) (9.47) (8.49) (51.45)
OILPROD_GDP-3 -7.93 -8.23 44.36** -4.15 -60.89* 8.22 -26.11 -13.04 -5.39
(12.95) (21.48) (18.61) (31.02) (29.74) (31.57) (30.89) (44.29) (38.43)
∆OILP 4.0E-3 4.0E-3 4.2E-3 5.2E-3* -2.3E-3 5.5E-3 6.4E-3 1.6E-2 1.1E-2
(2.7E-3) (5.6E-3) (3.5E-3) (3.0E-3) (4.6E-3) (4.0E-3) (5.8E-3) (1.5E-2) (0.8E-2)
∆OILP-1 1.6E-3 -3.2E-3 -0.6E-3 1.4E-3 -6.3E-3 0.8E-3 0.2E-3 -3.6E-3 2.7E-3
(2.4E-3) (2.9E-3) (3.3E-3) (2.7E-3) (4.2E-3) (3.6E-3) (2.9E-3) (5.3E-3) (5.7E-3)
∆OILP-2 1.8E-3 -2.6E-3 2.1E-3 3.3E-3 -4.0E-3* 4.5E-3 -2.5E-3 1.4E-3 1.8E-3
(2.3E-3) (2.6E-3) (2.7E-3) (2.3E-3) (1.7E-3) (3.2E-3) (4.2E-3) (5.4E-3) (6.4E-3)
∆LGDP_CAP 0.28*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.15** 0.21*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 0.19***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
∆KOF 1.1E-3 0.9E-3 0.1E-4 2.5E-4 1.8E-4 5.0E-4 2.0E-3* 2.1E-3 1.6E-3
(0.7E-3) (0.9E-3) (5.9E-4) (6.0E-4) (7.0E-4) (6.0E-4) (1.0E-3) (1.4E-3) (1.8E-3)
∆PROP_1564 -1.5E-2 1.3E-2 -1.3E-2 -1.3E-2 1.1E-2* 1.2E-2 -1.4E-2* -1.2E-2 -1.1E-2
(1.1E-2) (0.8E-2) (1.3E-2) (1.4E-2) (0.5E-2) (1.5E-2) (0.7E-2) (1.4E-2) (1.4E-2)
∆PROP_65 0.5E-3 2.3E-3 3.0E-3 8.4E-3 1.3E-2 3.6E-3 0.2E-2 1.9E-2 0.3E-3
(9.5E-3) (2.1E-3) (8.0E-3) (9.0E-3) (2.1E-2) (9.0E-3) (2.5E-2) (4.9E-2) (5.8E-3)
∆TGREV-1 -0.15* -0.26* 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.08 -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.22
(0.09) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.15)
R-squared 0.10 0.4 0.09 0.08 0.43 0.09 0.43 0.54 0.66
Observations 1087 361 686 673 189 546 409 172 140
Countries 63 27 35 35 14 26 30 14 9
The effect of oil windfalls on the government revenues.
Table 3
Note: *-Significant at the 10 percent level; **-significant at the 5 percent level; ***-significant at the 1 percent level. The numbers in 
parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered at the country level. Dependent variable is ∆TGREV . All regressions include year fixed 
effects and country specific trends. The samples of "Oil rich" country-years are country-years in which the value of oil production 
weakly exceeds 0.5 percent of GDP (OIL_GDP>=.5). The samples of "Devel." country-years are country-years in which the level of 
GDP per capita exceeds 4000 US$ (measured in constant US$, base year 2000).  R-squared refers to the within-variation.
Pres. form of governmentAll regime types Parl. form of government
Regime type
Oil intensity and All Oil rich Developed All Oil rich Developed All Oil rich Developed
  level of development
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆TGREV -0.34** -0.06 -0.89*** -0.17 0.00 0.22 -0.11 -0.37* -0.37*** 
(0.15) (0.24) (0.24) (1.10) (0.21) (0.27) (0.19) (0.20) (0.11)
∆TGREV-1 0.49*** 0.43*** 0.53** -2.94 -0.36 -0.52 0.45*** 0.23 0.67***
(0.16) (0.05) (0.24) (3.43) (0.28) (0.65) (0.07) (0.18) (0.11)
∆TGREV-2 0.21 0.18** 0.83*** 3.60 0.43 -1.05 0.34*** 0.02 1.04***
(0.22) (0.08) (0.41) (3.90) (0.56) (0.70) (0.12) (0.22) (0.29)
F(∆TGREV ) [p] 40.11 [0.00] 26.59 [0.00] 98.52  [0.00] 5.60 [0.00] 4.94 [0.01] 9.57 [0.00] 16.21 [0.00] 20.21 [0.00] 67.47 [0.00]
F(∆TGREV-1 ) [p] 65.04 [0.00] 46.80 [0.00] 92.50 [0.00] 1.90 [0.13] 6.22 [0.00] 1.67 [0.19] 31.96 [0.00] 81.65 [0.00] 119.9 [0.00]
F(∆TGREV-2 ) [p] 48.27 [0.00] 53.59  [0.00] 23.06 [0.00] 2.68 [0.05] 12.48 [0.00] 4.02 [0.01] 73.98 [0.00] 34.06 [0.00] 23.07 [0.00]
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald (p) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald (F) 4.18 1.81 12.79 0.17 1.90 1.08 6.23 1.40 16.04
Anderson-Rubin Wald F (p) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.00
Hansen J (p) 0.31 0.11 0.50 0.23 0.74 0.06 0.16 0.07 0.27
Observations 1039 351 658 642 187 522 394 164 136
Countries 63 27 35 35 14 26 30 14 9
Parl. form of government Pres. form of government
Table 4
Government revenues and expenditures across regime types: IV(2SLS)-estimates
Note: *-Significant at the 10 percent level; **-significant at the 5 percent level; ***-significant at the 1 percent level. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered at 
the country level. The dependent variable is ∆TGEXP . Contermporaneous and two lags of first-differenced government revenues, ∆TGREV , are instrumented using the 
contemporaneous- and three lags of the WINDFALL  variable (in addition to the baseline set of controls, a full set of country- and year indicators, and each component of the 
WINDFALL  variable with the associated lags). The F-test refer to the test of the joint significance of the four WINDFALL  intruments in the 1. stage regerssions, with the corresponding 
p -values in brackets. The Kleibergen-Paap LM- and Wald-statistics refer to the LM and Wald versions of the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk statistics, which test the null hypothesis of 
underidentification. The Anderson-Rubin F-statistics refer to the Anderson-Rubin (1949) Wald F-statistics, which tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the endogenous 
regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero and that the overidentifying restrictions are also valid. Finally, the Hansen J statistic refer to the test of the null hypothesis 
of instrument validity. The abbreviations (p) and (F) refer to p-values and F-statistics, respectively.
All regime types
Appendix
A.1 Operators and variable denitions
Operators and indicies
The rst di¤erence operator (:) indicates changes in the respective variable from time t  1 to
time t. All variables are country-year observations, and are indexed according to their contextual
time dimensions in the main text.
Institutional variables:
PRES: Dummy variable for forms of government, equal to 1 in presidential regimes, 0 otherwise.
Regimes in which the condence of the assembly is not necessary for the executive to stay in
power, even if an elected president is not chief executive or if there is no elected president, are
classied as presidential. Most semipresidential and premier-presidential systems are classied
as parliamentary (see chapter 4 in PT (2003) for further discussion). Sources: PT (2003) and
the World Bank Database on Political Institutions (DPI).
MAJ : Dummy variable for electoral systems, equal to 1 if all the lower house in a country is
elected under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Only legislative elections are considered (see chapter 4
in PT (2003) for clarication). Sources: PT (2003) and the World Bank Database on Political
Institutions (DPI).
DEM : Interpolated version of the Polity- and Gastil indexes. Computed as the forecasted
value obtained by regressing the rescaled values of Polity on Gastil, and normalized to lie between
0 and 1, where 0 is the lowest possible score and 1 is the highest. Here, Polity refer to the Polity
IV Project <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm> variable POLITY 2, while
Gastil is an average of indexes for civil liberties and political rights provided by the Freedom
House, Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings.
POLCONIII: The POLCONIII variable, from the POLCON database 2006 (Henisz,
2002). The variable ranges between zero and one, and represents an estimate of (Henisz, 2002,
p.363): ...the feasibility of policy change (the extent to which a change in the preferences of any
one actor may lead to a change in government policy).... For more detailed information on this
variable, see Henisz (2002).
Fiscal policy variables:
TGEXP : Total government expenditure, taken from the IFS. Source: Brender and Drazen
(2005).
TGREV : Total revenue and grants, calculated as Revenue plus Grants from the IFS dataset.
Source: Brender and Drazen (2005).
Oil variables:
OIL_GDP : The value of oil extraction (calculated as the product of oil production volume
and the crude oil prices net of average unit extraction costs) as a percentage of GDP at current
prices. Sources: Oil production volume and crude oil price are from the World Banks dataset
on genuine savings (adjusted net savings). GDP in current USD are from World Development
Indicators.
OIL_PROD: The quantity of oil production, measured in tons. Source: World Bank Ad-
justed Net Savings Dataset.
OIL_RESERV ES: Oil reserves in million metric tons, recalculated from barrels using the
conversion calculator provided by the Energy Information Administration (EIA). Source: The
EIA: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/contents.html.
OIL_PRICE: The world market price of crude oil per metric ton, base year 2000. Source:
World Bank Adjusted Net Savings Dataset.
WINDFALL: Dened in Section 2.3.
Economic and demographic control variables:
GDP : The level of (real) GDP, measured in constant U.S. dollars, base year 2000. Source: The
World Banks World Development Indicators database.
LGDPCAP : The natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in constant U.S. dollars, base
year 2000. Source: The World Banks World Development Indicators database.
PROP_1564: The percentage of a countrys population between 15 and 64 years old in the
total population. Source: The World Banks World Development Indicators database.
PROP_65: The percentage of the population over the age of 65 in the total population.
Source: The World Banks World Development Indicators database.
KOF : A composite index of globalization, composed of data on economic globalization (e.g.,
trade, FDI, import barriers, etc.), social globalization (e.g., personal contact, information ows,
and cultural proximity), and political globalization (e.g, the number of embassies in the country,
participation in the U.N. Security Council Missions, or membership in international organiza-
tions. Source: Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008).
A.2 Tables
Regime type
WINDFALL -specification Five years Ten years Reserves Five years Ten years Reserves Five years Ten years Reserves
Estimation method OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
WINDFALL 0.09*** 0.10* 4.19*** -0.14 -1.16 -9.22* 0.09*** 0.10 4.26***
(0.02) (0.05) (1.22) (0.17) (0.91) (4.85) (0.02) (0.06) (1.48)
WINDFALL-1 0.16*** 0.12*** 7.91*** 0.25 0.40 12.94*** 0.23*** 0.13*** 8.97***
(0.06) (0.04) (1.59) (0.32) (0.58) (4.11) (0.06) (0.03) (1.35)
WINDFALL-2 0 0.09*** 1.31 -0.01 -0.17 2.40 0.04 0.13*** 3.04***
(0.05) (0.03) (1.36) (0.22) (0.21) (6.61) (0.05) (0.03) (1.25)
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.39 0.41 0.42
Observations 1032 855 936 631 503 581 398 349 354
Countries 63 62 65 35 34 37 30 29 29
Alternative operationalizations of OIL_INTENSITY  in the Table 3-regressions. Full sample
Table A1a
Note: *-Significant at the 10 percent level; **-significant at the 5 percent level; **-significant at the 1 percent level. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered 
at the country level. Dependent variable is ∆TGREV . "WINDFALL -specification": "Five years" and "Ten years" means that the WINDFALL -variable is constructed using the five- 
and ten year lags of oil production volumes, respectively. "Reserves" means that the WINDFALL-variable is instead constructed using the size of the countries' proven reserves. 
All regressions are fixed-effects regressions, including a one-year lag of the dependent variable, full sets of country- and year indicators, the baseline set of control variables, and 
each of the components of the respective WINDFALL-variables (with lags). R-squared reports on the within-variation.
Presidential form of governmentAll regime types Parliamentary form of government
Regime type
WINDFALL -specification Five years Ten years Reserves Five years Ten years Reserves Five years Ten years Reserves
Estimation method OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
WINDFALL 0.08*** 0.06 3.50** 0.16 0.21 -4.64* 0.05 0.00 2.31
(0.03) (0.06) (1.46) (0.14) (0.38) (2.42) (0.04) (0.09) (1.94)
WINDFALL-1 0.21*** 0.14*** 9.24*** 0.50* 0.21 10.39*** 0.26*** 0.17*** 10.32***
(0.07) (0.04) (1.64) (0.25) (0.31) (3.36) (0.08) (0.06) (2.04)
WINDFALL-2 -0.01 0.10*** 1.53 -0.05 0.04 -3.17 0.00 0.10*** 2.38
(0.06) (0.02) (1.57) (0.17) (0.24) (3.40) (0.06) (0.03) (1.39)
R-squared 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.36 0.29 0.48 0.47 0.52
Observations 347 304 342 181 158 194 166 146 148
Countries 26 25 27 13 13 15 14 13 13
Alternative operationalizations of OIL_INTENSITY  in the Table 3-regressions. "Oil rich" sample
Table A1b
Note: *-Significant at the 10 percent level; **-significant at the 5 percent level; **-significant at the 1 percent level. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered 
at the country level. Dependent variable is ∆TGREV. "WINDFALL-specification": "Five years" and "Ten years" means that the WINDFALL-variable is constructed using the 
five- and ten year lags of oil production volumes, respectively. "Reserves" means that the WINDFALL-variable is instead constructed using the size of the countries' proven 
reserves. All regressions are fixed-effects regressions, including a one-year lag of the dependent variable, full sets of country- and year indicators, the baseline set of control 
variables, and each of the components of the respective WINDFALL-variables (with lags). R-squared reports on the within-variation.
Presidential form of governmentAll regime types Parliamentary form of government
Estimation method OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable ∆TGEXP ∆TGEXP ∆TGEXP ∆TGEXP ∆TGEXP ∆TGEXP
WINDFALL -0.08** -0.59** -0.66** -0.30 -0.59** -0.56
(0.03) (0.17) (0.25) (0.34) (0.19) (0.43)
WINDFALL-1 0.09** -0.18 -0.24* -0.08 -0.28 0.05
(0.03) (0.15) (0.14) (0.53) (0.18) (0.46)
WINDFALL-2 0.07** 0.00 0.10 -0.89 0.19 0.27
(0.03) (0.12) (0.19) (0.58) (0.14) (0.86)
WINDFALL x PRES 0.55** 0.61** 0.48** 0.53** 0.59**
(0.18) (0.25) (0.18) (0.18) (0.29)
WINDFALL x PRES-1 0.28* 0.34** 0.22 0.27 0.33*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
WINDFALL x PRES-2 0.09 -0.02 0.15 0.08 0.06
(0.12) (0.19) (0.18) (0.13) (0.22)
WINDFALL x MAJ 0.09 0.18
(0.37) (0.36)
WINDFALL x MAJ-1 0.08 0.09
(0.21) (0.24)
WINDFALL x MAJ-2 -0.04 -0.08
(0.28) (0.28)
WINDFALL x POLITY_2 -0.03 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
WINDFALL x POLITY_2-1 -0.01 -0.03
(0.05) (0.04)
WINDFALL x POLITY_2-2 0.09* 0.01
(0.05) (0.07)
WINDFALL x POLCONIII -0.04 -0.09
(0.17) (0.14)
WINDFALL x POLCONIII-1 0.16 -0.15
(0.21) (0.40)
WINDFALL x POLCONIII-2 -0.24** -0.46
(0.11) (0.27)
R-squared 0.072 0.081 0.088 0.084 0.090 0.093
Observations 1093 1078 1049 1060 1058 1028
Countries 63 63 62 62 63 61
Table A2
Oil windfalls and government expenditures: Institutional correlates
Note: *-Significant at the 10 percent level; **-significant at the 5 percent level. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, 
clustered at the country level. All regressions are fixed-effects regressions, including full sets of country- and year indicators, the 
baseline set of control variables, and each of the components in the WINDFALL-variable (OILPROD_GDP and ∆OILP) with lags 
and interacted with the respective institutional variables (results not displayed). R-squared refers to the within R-squared.
Regime type
WINDFALL -variables All All >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 <0
Estimation method OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WINDFALL 0.18** 0.19** 0.58** 0.43** -0.41** -0.19 0.78** 0.42**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.20) (0.24) (0.09) (0.12)
WINDFALL-1 0.12** 0.13** -0.12 0.37** 0.58* 1.68** -0.20* 0.39**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.08) (0.31) (0.59) (0.10) (0.14)
WINDFALL-2 -0.04              
(0.04)              
R-squared 0.10 0.09 0.55 0.28 0.39 0.32 0.93 0.69
Observations 1087 1113 143 235 99 174 43 61
Countries 63 63 41 40 27 27 14 13
Symmetry in the effect of the WINDFALL- variables in the Table 3 regressions
Table A3
Note: *-Significant at the 10 percent level; **-significant at the 5 percent level. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered at the country 
level. Dependent variable is ∆TGREV . "WINDFALL -variables": "All" means that inference is based on both positive and negative observations of the 
WINDFALL -variable, ">0" means that inference is based exclusively on observations with two or more consequtive lags of positive realizations of the 
WINDFALL -variable, while "<0" means that only observations with at least two consequtive lags of negative realizations of the WINDFALL -variable are 
included. All regressions are fixed-effects regressions, including a one-year lag of the dependent variable, full sets of country- and year indicators, the baseline set 
of control variables, and each of the components of the respective WINDFALL-variables (with lags). R-squared reports on the within-variation.
Pres. form of gov.All regime types Parl. form of gov.
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